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Book Reviews
Engene, Jan Oskar.  Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the Trends Since
1950. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004.  
Well before the 9/11 attacks, scholars and policy makers alike concluded
that terrorist violence had undergone an important transformation in the last
quarter of the twentieth century.  Unlike the terrorist campaigns that took place
immediately following the Second World War, which were largely conducted by
separatists and ideologues against erstwhile imperial states weakened by war and
decolonization, the “new terrorism” appeared to center on the preservation of tra-
ditional religious values in the face of modernization.  This shift in focus was
ostensibly accompanied by marked changes in both scope and lethality, with
“new” terrorists focusing primarily on targets in other countries and seeking to
maximize body counts.  But has the “new” international terrorism fully over-
shadowed or supplanted the “old” domestic variety?  Just as importantly, even if
we have seen the end of an era, what general conclusions can be drawn about the
impetuses and conduct of domestic terrorism in its “golden age”?  In this cross-
national study of postwar Western European terrorism, Jan Oskar Engene has
both provided clear (and sometimes surprising) answers to the above questions
and compiled a new and invaluable database for scholars wishing to extend this
line of inquiry.
Engene begins by delineating a “communicative” theory of domestic ter-
rorism that centers on the relationships among four major actors: terrorists, the
immediate targets of their violence, and the two groups to whom they wish to
convey political messages with that violence, the state and the public.  According
to Engene, terrorist violence diminishes the legitimacy of the state’s rule by
breaking its monopoly on the use of force and, where legitimacy is based on
legality and the rule of law, by forcing the state to change the rules that govern
its relationship to the public (e.g., by infringing upon established civil liberties in
an effort to conduct counterterrorism).  If legitimacy can be sufficiently eroded,
the foundation is laid “for a change of allegiances and loyalties between groups
in society.” (p. 27)  When terrorists wish to force the state to accede to their sub-
stantive political demands (as is the case with separatists or Left-wing ideo-
logues), they attempt to follow up the diminution of public loyalty to the state
with the establishment of bonds between themselves and the public based in part
on popular identification with their goals.  When terrorists wish instead to dele-
gitimize the rule of law (as is the case with Right-wing ideologues), they seek to
replace public loyalty to the legalist state with a “subordinate” relationship in
which legitimacy is predicated on power or force, while at the same time
strengthening their own relationship to that increasingly authoritarian govern-
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ment.  As such, Engene portrays “anti-state” and “pro-state” domestic terrorism
as differing not in the methods by which each hopes to force change, but in how
each applies those methods to disrupt and construct bonds of loyalty among
political actors.    
In the legalist Western European context, Engene posits that domestic ter-
rorism is more likely when a particular government has experienced one or more
of three types of problems in the process by which they developed legitimacy.
First, problems of ethnic fractionalization are likely to lead to separatist move-
ments, especially given Western Europe’s self-deterministic state building tradi-
tion.  Second, problems of integration that result in the de facto exclusion of one
or more sectors of society from the political process (such as fringe parties) will
lead those excluded to use violence in lieu of a political voice.  Finally, problems
of continuity, characterized by “ruptures” in the democratic development
process, can lead to violence on the part of groups that long for the stability and
glory (real or imagined) of past, non-legalistic governments.  By polarizing soci-
eties and thus providing a vehicle by which support for the terrorist’s cause can
be mobilized, such preconditions cast doubt on the true legitimacy of the state,
giving terrorists an “in” to further weaken that legitimacy through their commu-
nicative violence.  Engene arrives at a more comprehensive predictive theory of
terrorism by adding these factors to features of modern societies (the level of
democracy, modernization, social injustice, and post-industrialism) identified by
previous studies as facilitators of terrorist violence.
Engene tests his hypotheses against his self-developed Terrorism in
Western Europe: Event Data (TWEED) dataset, a comprehensive, longitudinal
compilation of domestic terrorist acts in 18 Western European countries from
1950 to 1995.  This remarkable database is comprised of 10,239 terrorist events
which are differentiated on the basis of country, lethality, whether the acts were
perpetrated by organized and/or long-lived groups, and the ideology of the group
perpetrating them (ethnic, Left wing, or Right wing).  Interestingly, Engene’s
comparison to international terrorist datasets (such as the well-known ITERATE
project) shows that the volume of domestic terrorism in Western Europe since
1968 is much greater than the volume of international terrorism during that peri-
od, a finding which partially undermines the argument that the “new” terrorism
has supplanted the “old.”  Pearson’s r correlations reveal that high levels of
democracy, state respect for human rights, and political freedom have general
dampening effects on terrorist violence.  Uneven income distribution and eco-
nomic modernization are concluded to be positively associated with terrorist vio-
lence, especially ideological terrorism in the latter case.  In regards to the factors
Engene believes undermine legitimacy, ethnic fragmentation, not surprisingly,
increases the likelihood that a state will experience ethnic terrorism, while prob-
lems of continuity and integration both significantly increase the prospects of
ideological terrorism.  In his final substantive chapter, Engene sheds further light
on these findings by conducting in-depth case studies of each of the countries
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under examination, allowing for the specific identification of important trends
germane to the hypotheses.
Engene’s account of the impetuses for domestic terrorist violence repre-
sents a valuable clarification and extension of extant theoretical treatments.
Most notably, his “communicative” approach, by delving into the political rela-
tions crucial to the success of terrorist movements, reinforces the very important
notion that terrorism must be viewed as an activity that results from the same
considerations underpinning “normal” political discourse, and not some aberra-
tion perpetrated by unthinking zealots.  However, the theory suffers from some
potentially confounding conceptual problems.  In addition to unresolved tautolo-
gies in the hypotheses (is terrorism primarily a cause or effect of illegitimacy?)
and confusion invited by the inclusion of “pro-state” terror (can/how can one
include in this framework actions perpetrated by the state itself to shift bonds of
loyalty?), Engene’s claim that the state and public are terrorists’ only crucial
audiences is an oversimplification.  As Martha Crenshaw has noted, terrorists
actually attempt to communicate with two public audiences when engaging in
violence: the members of their “subgroup” – the broader group experiencing the
injustice perceived by the terrorists – and the rest of society at large; though he
makes passing reference to the subgroup, Engene does not explicitly incorporate
it into his theory.  From a rational choice perspective of insurgency, if terrorism
is observed, the subgroup must be assumed to have made an a priori decision that
violence is not the optimal means by which to redress its grievances with the
state.  Otherwise, “higher” levels of insurgency that involve more numerous par-
ticipants and rely less on terrorization would likely be observed.  Put differently,
terrorist violence represents not just the actions of a fringe group, but of a fringe
group whose methods are largely unpalatable to a majority of their compatriots.  
Ultimately, Engene’s failure to systematically distinguish between differ-
ent portions of the public, because it leads to an overestimation of the amount of
support that terrorists’ actions enjoy among the people they purport to represent,
also leads him to overestimate both the degree to which terrorist violence mobi-
lizes popular support and the difficulties faced by the state in reestablishing legit-
imacy.  For example, a response by the government that is successful at punish-
ing terrorists but concomitantly minimizes alienation of the subgroup can (as did
the French government’s response of “efficient repression” to initial terrorist
attacks by the Algerian FLN in November 1954) reestablish the greater public’s
faith in the legitimacy of the government by reaffirming both the state’s monop-
oly on force and the rule of law.  At the same time, such a response precludes the
development of significant bonds between the terrorists and the subgroup (the
Algerian population) by bolstering the subgroup’s belief that the terrorist’s
means are illegitimate.  If this situation prevails, the terrorist group must drasti-
cally change strategy and tactics (as did the FLN, which began to target the sub-
group to punish it for collaboration with French authorities) or face imminent
failure.   
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Moreover, some of Engene’s analytical methods are deserving of scrutiny.
To test his hypotheses, Engene conducts simple correlational analyses between
terrorist acts within countries and levels of democracy, ethnic fragmentation,
etc., at particular points within the data range (e.g., democracy levels in each
country in 1960, freedom levels in 1975), and these analyses are conducted in
isolation from one another.  This approach is problematic for several reasons.
First, Engene does not test for significant correlation between the independent
variables; such correlation, which almost certainly exists between such measures
as freedom, democracy, and development, could drastically impact the substan-
tive findings taken together.  Second, given that these explanatory measures vary
not only cross-nationally but longitudinally, and that extensive time series data
are available for nearly all the factors under examination (e.g., the POLITY and
Freedom House projects, World Bank World Development indicators, and other
compilations of economic data), it is perplexing that Engene does not conduct
cross-sectional time-series tests of his hypotheses.  Although Engene’s qualita-
tive analysis bears out many of his contentions, the robustness of his statistical
approach would be greatly improved given these modifications.
In all, despite some shortcomings, Engene’s study is an important
advancement in both the theory and analysis of domestic terrorism.  His concep-
tualization of terrorism as a communicative action undertaken by political actors
is lucid and largely convincing.  Above all, his TWEED dataset fills a crucial
void that has hamstrung empirical scholars of terrorist violence for some time,
and represents an indispensable resource for future scholars.  
Dennis M. Foster is an Assistant Professor of International Studies and Political
Science at the Virginia Military Institute. 
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The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) stands as proof of the adage that
“nothing succeeds like success.” Widely acknowledged as the pre-eminent vic-
tory in the counter-insurgency field, no post-war British campaign has been stud-
ied more thoroughly. Books by scholars and by former participants have mined
it for “lessons learned.”  As such, it provided the foundation for the development
of a comprehensive counter-insurgency doctrine that was applied with varying
degrees of success in campaigns from Kenya to Northern Ireland.
Because of the interest in identifying the “secrets” of the Malayan success,
the literature has tended to focus on campaign strategy, operations, and tactics.
What was missing from most of these studies was the wider strategic context in
